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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
Pli()I•:B~J

I-I. DURRANT,

~

.f _j ~f AtJtJ8ll619~ ~.
Case
No.10082

-n;;.~A~CY

PELTON",

Rjjx)l~-f

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
NATURE OF CASE
This i~ an appeal from a judgment in favor of the
respondent for damages occurring whe~eh~\e driven
hy the J~~~ collided 'Yith the"~' ~~ ,~/vehicle
'vhich \Yas stalled on W asa.tch Boulevard in or partly
\\·ithin a tr-aveled traffic lane at about 6 :00 p.m. on March
11, 1963.

DISPOSITION BY THE TRIAL COURT
The case 'Yas submitted to a jury which returned
a verdict for respondent in the amount of $656.37, plus
eo~t~.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks vacation of the judgment entered
upon the aforesaid verdict and an order of this Court
that the case be remanded for retrial upon proper instructions.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On March 11, 1963, at about the hour of 6:00 p.m.,
the appellant was proceeding in a southerly direction
along the public highway known as Wasatch Boulevard.
She had progressed beyond the intersection of that
Boulevard with the Parley's Canyon highway (the extension of 21st South Street) and was traversing the valley through which Wasatch Boulevard passes at this location. It was snowing heavily (R 126, 133, 140). The time
was app-roximately 6 :00 p.m., and it was already dark
( R 133, 140). All the vehicles on the highway at the time
(except for plaintiff's vehicle as to which there is conflict
in the evidence) had their lights burning. Respondent's
vehicle had stalled on Wasatch Boulevard at a point
which is a short distance up the south slope of the valley.
According to respondent's testimony, her vehicle was
stalled at such a position that it merely projected into
the west lane of traffic (R 98). The testimony of the
appellant and two disinterested witnesses is, however,
that respondent's vehicle was stalled directly in the middle of the west lane of traffic (R 143, 158). As the highway
is constructed through the aforesaid valley, it curves distinctly to the right as one moves up the south slope.
(Defendant's Exhibit 7.) Appellant was driving her
vehicle in the right or westernmost lane of traffic at a
2
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spt'l'd \vhich was well within the posted speed limit
( R 13:-J, 140). There is no contradiction of her testimony
thnt her vision was then restricted by the falling sno""
and the advC'nt of darkness. At the moment she began
b.- r ascent of the south slope, the difficulties of seeing
herume more pronounc.ed as her headlights were beamed
into the di rPet ion of snowfall, and the headlights of on<'oming ears rame into her line of vision (R 133). It
wns at this point in her progress that, as her eyes beenme adjusted to the new circumstances and she had prore(ldcd far enough around the curve so that respondent's
car \ras directly in front of her, appellant became aware
thnt respondent's vehicle was in her path and that some
{\ffort must be made to avoid collision (R 134). There
is conflict in the evidence as to whether respondent
had taken any action to warn oncoming drivers of the
presence of her vehicle. Appellant's witnesses testified
that the lights of the respondent's vehicle were not even
turned on (R 141, 158). Appellant was unable to turn
from the \YC'sternmost lane of traffic into the adjoining
lane because of traffic on her left ( R 128). Even though
~he "·as proceeding at a slower rate of speed than had
l'l'~pondent previously been proceeding (R 48) and slower
than the speed of other cars on Wasatch Boulevard
(R 140), she "\Vas unable to bring her car to a stop ·in time
to avoid collision with plaintiff's vehicle.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COURT ERRED IN INSTRUCTING THE
JURY THAT THE APPELLANT HAD, IN
3
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ESSENCE, AN OBLIGATION TO l\IAINTAIN
SUCH CONTROL OVER HER VEHICLE
THAT SHE COULD BRING IT TO A CO~I
PLETE STOP, WHATEVER THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF VISIBILITY MIGHT BE,
WITHIN THE RANGE OF HER VISION.
One of appellant's principal contentions, in denying liability under the facts of the instant case, \Vas that
she could not, in the exercise of reasonable care, have
avoided the collision which is the basis of respondent's
complaint. We believe this Court has been most explicit, in
its decisions, as to the responsibilities of the drivers of
vehicles under the circumstances of the instant case.
While the driver who drives his car into the rear of a
stalled vehicle must certainly justify his failure to stop
or turn in order to avoid the collision, this Court has distinctly recognized that such failures can be satisfactorily
explained so that the collision falls into the category of
''unavoidable accidents''. This Court has had occasion
to consider a number of cases where the driver of the
following vehicle undertook to explain his failure to
stop on the basis of visual difficulties such as darkness,
the fact that snow was falling, the fact that the lights of
oncoming cars blinded him and the fact that the curvature of the highway prevented his becoming aware of the
stalled vehicle in time to take effective action even though
his speed was, under the circumstances of which he had
knowledge, reasonable.
We believe that, where this Court has stated with
great particularity what the responsibilities of individuals are under a given and commonly recurring situa4
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tion it i~ tlH' obligation of the trial court, \vhen requested,
to g-ivtl nn inst ruetion 'vhich is oriented to the situation
rathPr than to g-ive a general instruction in terms which
hn\'P little meaning to the la.y mind.
~

In thP instant ease, the Court refused to give the reqHPStPd instruction on unavoidable accident which had
relation to the sperific facts of the case. The instructions
in fat·t g-ivt'n hy the Court as to the duty of the appellant
WPI'P an adoption of the doctrine of Dalley v. Midwestern
/Jairy. 80 Utah 331, a 1932 case which has been frequf'ntly criticized hy this and other courts. That case
stated the controlling rule to be "That it is negligence as
n mnttPr of la'v for a person to drive an automobile upon
a traveled public highway" * * * "at such a rate of speed
that ~aid automobile cannot be stopped within the distnnct' at 'vhich the operator of said car is able to see
objects upon the highway in front of him.'' The Court's
Instruction No. 6 in the instant case is a paraphrase of
the quoted language. For the Court's convenience, we
r(\produce it here:
'' \"'" ou are instructed that there was a duty on
tla"' part of the defendant to keep her vehicle
always under control so as to avoid an accident.
She had no right to assume that the road was
clear but under all circumstances and at all times
she "·as required to be Yigilant and to anticipate
and expect the presence of other vehicles upon the
highway. The test of control is the ability to stop,
slo",. down or turn out quickly and easily. When
this result is not accomplished, the inference can
readily be made that the vehicle was running too
fast or that proper effort to control it was not
5
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made. If, therefore, you find from a preponderance of the evidence in this case that at and immediately prior to the time of the accident the defendant did not have her vehicle under proper control, then in that event the defendant was negligent.''
Not only did the trial court instruct the jury in the
doctrine of the Dalley case by Instruction No. 6, the
Court emphasized and re-emphasized that doctrine in Instructions 7 and 8. No juror, having read Instructions
6, 7 and 8, could come to any conclusion about the law to
be applied except that a driver is negligent if he runs
into any obstruction on the highway which does not drop
out of the sky immediately in front of him. For this jury,
the only relief from the stark adjuration that a driver
must always ''keep her vehicle always under control so
as to a void an accident'' 'vas the J .I.F.U. instruction on
unavoidable accidents which is, of course, stated in general terms and could not be related to the instant case by
a conscientious juror in view of the fact that the Court
had particularly instructed that a defendant must always
be able to stop within the range of his vision.
Since the trial court was so clearly persuaded to the
point of view of Dalley v. Midwestern Daliry, it is appropriate for us now to consider the extent to which that
case expresses the present position of this Court. We
believe the Dalley case has been so differentiated and its
application so restricted in later Utah cases that it can no
longer be cited as a statement of the basic la'v of this
State.
6
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The defendant's vPhicle, in the Dalley case, was
stalled on a. straight strctrh of highway, there was nothing to obstruct the plaintiff's vision, and weather condition~ \\'Pre good. The Court sustained a directed verdict n~ninst the plaintiff (the driver of the following car
which collided 'vith the stalled vehicle) and stated the
('nntrolling nlle to be "that it is negligence as a matter
of lnw for a person to drive an automobile upon a trav<'led public high"·ay'' ... "at such a rate of speed that
said automobile cannot be stopped within the distance
at whirh the operator of said car is able to see objects
upon the high,vay in front of him.''
It should be noted that, in each of the Dalley case
and the cases therein cited, there was comment about the
plaintiff's ''dilemma'' - i. e. either his lights were inadequate or he failed to keep a reasonable lookout. Where
the facts as to Yisibility are changed, however, the Utah
Court haR come to entirely different conclusions a.s to the
patency of the following driver's negligence. In Trimble
v. ["nion Pacific Stages, 142 Pac. 2d 764 (1943), the
Court review·ed the Dalley case and its antecedents and,
limiting those cases to their facts, said ''We do not believe this (the Dalley doctrine) to be the correct rule of
la"·'' "·hen applied to a situation where there is fog,
smoke or some other obstruction of the following driver's
Yision. Some fifteen cases from almost as many jurisdictions were cited in support of the Court's conclusion
that mere failure to stop within vision's range is not
nec.essarily negligence where vision is obstructed by factors beyond the control of the following driver.
7
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The statement of the Trimble case that negligence
must be proved by more than the fact of collision 'vas
reaffirmed by the Court in Hodges v. Waite, 270 P. 2d
461, where the obstruction was a curve in the highway.
There again, the question of whether the following driver
(the plaintiff in that case) was negligent was a matter
for the jury. The judicial statement which most effeetively lays the ghost of the Dalley case, however, is found
in Federa.ted Milk Producers Association v. Stateu,ide
Plumbing & Heating, 358 Pac. 2d 348 (1961). ''The Dalley
ca.se rule on which defendant relies,'' said Justice Wade,
''requires a showing from which it must inevitably follow that plaintiff did not keep a lookout ahead ... or
did not heed what he saw or he could not see ... becau,se
his lights were not such as are prescribed by law." (Our
emphasis)
There is no shred of evidence in the instant case that
appellant failed to keep a lookout or that her lights
were less than what the law requires. The credible evidence is that she was unable to stop within a few feet
after she discerned through the snow that a snow-covered
car with its lights off was stalled directly in her traffic
lane in the darkness ahead.
In the instant case, the facts could hardly more clearly establish that we are dealing with a situation where
Da.lley v. Midwestern DaJiry has no application. Everyone agrees that it was dark enough so that headlights
\Ycre necessary for vision. Appellant's \vitnesses,
who have no interest in the outcome of this case, testified that it was not merely dusk but dark. Exhibit P-6
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t-stablishPs the time at which the sun descended below a
t'lut horizon. The Court may, of course, take knowledge
of the fact that the Oquirrh Range rises well above the
t'lnt horizon in the path of the sun's descent 'vest of the
ll.e('ident site during early spring. That it was snowing heavily at the time of the accident is also a matter
of .~Pneral agreement. :\lr. and Mrs. Anderson were
vpry positive in their statements as to the effect of the
sno\\' to obscure vision. The fact that the highway curves
so that a stalled vehicle at the accident site would not
be in direct line of a following driver's vision for any
great distance is made clear by an examination of deff•ndant 's Exhibit 7. The evidence is also \vithout
contradiction that there were northbound cars on the
highway, that their headlights were burning and that the
beams of their lights were occasionally directed into
appellant's eyes as she began her ascent of the south
slope of the dip. All that the Court need judicially notice to complete the picture of the appellant in a predicament dangerous for reasons beyond her control is
the physical fact that falling snow tends to obscure vision
more as one drives upward into it.
Under the facts of this case, Instructions 6, 7 and 8
were entirely improper, and it was improper for the
Court to deliver them even if the Court had also given
some instruction reasonably calculated to impart the
respondent's legal position. In the absence of an instruction reasonably communicating to the jury the view of
the Trimble case, the Hodges case and the Federated Milk
Jlroducers case, the trial court's delivery of Instructions
6, 7 and 8 was clear and prejudicial error.
9
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POINT II
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GIVE
APPELLANT'S REQUESTED I N S T R U CTION NO. 11.
There is abundant evidence, most of which is not
contradicted in the slightest by respondent, that a great
many factors contributed to appellant's inability to see
respondent's stalled car. There were the darkness, the
falling snow, the change in light refraction as appellant's car began to ascend, the glare of oncoming headlights, the curvature of the road, and the natural camouflage of plaintiff's snow-covered car. Defendant did
not even have the benefit of plaintiff's tail lights if \YC
are to believe her testimony and that of the Andersons,
the only disinterested witnesses.
Clearly, the evidence brings this case within the
scope of the doctrine so carefully stated by this Court in
Federated Milk Producers Ass'n., Inc. v. Statewide
Plumbing & Heating Co. (supra). This Court there reviewed its several previous decisions on the point and
approved the view of the Washington Court that, when
visibility becomes difficult, a driver is not obliged to stop.
If, indeed, the law were to impose a duty on motorists
to stop or come to a near stop under such conditions,
traffic would stop entirely with the most cautious driver.
Obviously, a driver beginning to ascend a hill during a
snow storm acts reasonably if he tries to maintain some
momentum. He may other,vise become a highway obstruction himself.

10
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The statement of doctrine in the Federated Milk case,
to whieh we have referred, is this:
''The unseeability of substantial objects on the
highway in time to avoid an accident may depend
on many things other than inattention, faulty
headlights, or failure to give heed to what 'vas
there to be seen. A sudden heavy smoke, fog,
snow or rain storm, lightning or approaching
headlights or a combination of some or all of these
clements, coupled with the negligence of the other
party, may make an accident unavoidable regardless of how alert and competent a driver is or
how well equipped his car is with brakes, lights
and other necessary appliances. The visibility of
substantial objects may depend on their size,
shape, color or whether they absorb or reflect light
or blend with or stand out in contrast to the background. To be alert to all surrounding conditions,
to have good eyesight, to have proper headlights
and brakes and to keep the vehicle under relatively
safe control are all very important, but under
some circumstances all of these things are not sufficient to enable a reasonably prudent driver to
avoid an accident.'' (From page 298 of the Utah
Report.)
This is precisely the instruction appellant requested
the Court to deliver (Defendant's Requested Instruction No. 11 ; Record p. 49). The Court refused to do
so, even though the authority for the requested instruction was rited and shown to the Court. Instead, the
Court gave a general instruction on unavoidable accident and gave three specific instructions conveying the
view that a driver must, at all times, be able to come
to a full stop within the range of his vision and that one
\vho stalls a car, however negligently, upon a highway
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may assume that following drivers will be able to see
and avoid the stalled car. In short, the trial court dPliberately ignored the last pronouncement of this Court
as to the obligations of motorists under conditions of
difficult visibility.
Appellant contends the failure of the trial court to
give Defendant's Requested Instruction No. 11 constitutes prejudicial error. No conscientious juror could have
found this accident was "unavoidable" in the face of
the instructions 6, 7 and 8 given by the trial court. Had
defendant's instruction been given, no conscientious
juror could have found otherwise than that the accident was unavoidable.
POINT III
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GIVE
APPELLANT'S REQUESTED I N S T R U CTION NO. 13.
Respondent filed her complaint in this matter in June
of 1963 over her attorney's signature. In Paragraph 1
of that complaint, she alleges that her car was "stalled,
out of gas'' on the highway at the time of the accident.
Respondent persisted in this statement of fact through the
pretrial conference, and the pretrial order framed, as an
issue, "Thether or not respondent's failure "to have her
car properly fueled so the same would not run out of gas
at a dangerous time and place'' constituted negligence.
Appellant briefed the point and relied upon respondent's
admitted failure to keep gas in her car as a defense.
It ""as not until the trial of the case that the respondent made any· effort to amend her pleadings to avoid the
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pffpet of tht' admission in her pleadings that she had
run out of g-ns. I>uring the trial, respondent testified that
ht'r gus gagP sho,ved an adequate gas supply at the time
of the accident anrl that she later drove the car before
it \\'ns refuelPtl. Appellant objected to such testimony
and indicated to the Court that plaintiff should not be
permit ted to tPstify contrary to the allegations of her
<'ontplaint particularly when defendant had no reason
to anticipate such testimony. The officer who investigntt~d the accident might have seen the gas gage. The
people who towed the car away may have refueled it.
. \ ppellant made no effort to obtain such evidence berause the need for it appeared to be lacking. Nevertheless, respondent \Yas permitted by the Court to amend her
eomplaint at the conclusion of her evidence to delete the
ref{'rl'nre to her having run out of gas.
~\ppellant

having objected to the amendment of the
romplaint and the introduction of evidence that the car
stalled for any reason other than lack of fuel as alleged
in the complaint, then asked the court to instruct the
jury that it must find plaintiff had run out of fuel and
to consider whether plaintiff was or was not negligent
on that basis. The Court refused to do so.
The only basis upon which amendments to conform
to the evidence are properly made is Rule 15(b), Utah
Rult"~ of Civil Procedure. That rule reads in its entirety
as follows:
• ' ....\.)IEXD)IE~Ts To CoNFORM To THE EVIDENCE.

When issues not raised by the pleadings are tried
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by express or implied consent of the parties, they
shall be treated in all respects as if they had been
raised in the pleadings. Such amendment of th(l
pleadings as may be necessary to cause them to
conform to the evidence and to raise these issues
may be made upon motion of any party at any time,
even after judgment; but failure so to amend does
not affect the result of the trial of these issue~. If
evidenee is objected to at the trial on the ground
that it is not within the issues made by the pleadings, the court may allo"'" the pleadings to be
amended when the presentation of the merits of
the aetion will be subserved thereby and the objecting party fails to satisfy the court that the admission of such evidence would prejudice him in
maintaining his action or defense upon thr merits.
The court shall grant a continuance, if necessary,
to enable the objecting party to meet such eYidence. ''
The rule has application only to issues not raised by the
pleadings and permits amendment which W'ill cause the
pleadings to raise the issues as they \Vere posed by the
evidence. It is not true that the pleadings in this case are
silent on the issue of whether respondent permitted her
vehicle to run out of gas. Respondent alleged that she did,
and appellent admitted it. That issue was fully disposed of by the pleadings. We contend it \\Tas error
for the trial court to permit the amendment over objection. In any event, appellant should have been given
an opportunity to develop her evidence on the point.
We believe the defense of eontributory negligence based
on fuel exhaustion is a meritorious defense. At least one
court has ruled that it is negligence as a matter of law
to obstruct a high,vay because of fuel exhaustion. In
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Krller v. Brenemarn, 153 Wash. 208, 279 Pac. 588, 67
.\. L. R. 92, the Court said:
"II is first act of negligence was in operating it
over the high,vay in a condition to become stalled
for want of a sufficient supply of gasoline.''

''A motor vehicle is a complicated piece of
mrrhanism, and some part of it may give way and
cause it to stall, no matter what degree of care the
operator may have exercised to keep it in prop~r
condition, and it is a want of such care to pernnt
it to stall for 'vant of a sufficient supply of gasoline.''

Research has revealed no judicial statement of a
contrary view. 1
CONCLUSION
~lost

of the Utah cases which have posed the issue
now before this Court have been cases when the following driver was plaintiff, not defendant. Even in Dolley
v. J/ idwestern Dairy, the plaintiff was the following
driver who ran into the back of a truck on a clear day,
on a straight stretch of road when road conditions were
excellent. It is usually the driver who obstructs the
highway who is called upon to explain his conduct.
In the instant case, appellant was unable to avoid collision by reason of a combination of circumstances beyond
her control. This Court has frequently commented upon
and clearly defined the standard of care which must be
satisfied by people driving under conditions of poor visi1

See discussion in Pot'tl v. Herotl, 353 P. 2d 702 (Okla. 1960).
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bility. Appellant is a "·orking woman \vho \Yas dri,·ing
her two little children home from a day care center at
dinner time in a snow storm. The trial court so instructed the jury that it was obliged to find that she \\'as duty
bound to expect that respondent (or someone of like habits) \\·ould stall a car in the middle of the traffic lane of
Salt Lake County's major freeway. \Ve believe the needs
of society are badly served by any rule of la"\\r \Yhich
\vould require her to park under such circumstances. We
submit that she \vas not given a fair trial by a jury
instructed as this one was.
Respectfully submitted,
CLYDE, ?\IECHAl\1 &. PRATT
FRANK J. ALLEN"
351 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for Appellant
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